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Mexico's Banks After the December





The immediate effects of the December 1994 peso devaluation
and the period of high interest rates and economic recession that fol-
lowed had important repercussions for the Mexican banking and fi-
nancial system. Since the onset of the crisis, the Mexican government
has undertaken a number of important actions designed to assure ade-
quate capitalization of financial institutions and continued public con-
fidence in the banking system. The goal throughout has been to avoid
a banking crisis that would exacerbate the contraction in the real
economy and to set the stage for a recovery of the financial system
based on sound institutions and efficient financial markets. The steps
taken have included amendments to the legal framework for foreign
ownership of banks, reinforcement of supervision, programs for re-
capitalizing troubled banks, the introduction of inflation-indexed
lending and the provision of indexed funding to banks, a debtor relief
program and direct intervention of those banks that proved unable to
weather the crisis and its aftermath. The combination of these meas-
ures has permitted most of the banks and the banking and payments
* This article was initially submitted in mid-October 1995 and reflects only developments
occurring prior to such time.
* Commercial Banking Advisor, International Finance Corporation, Washington, D.C.
** Private Sector Regulatory Specialist, Latin America and the Caribbean Technical Depart-
ment, The World Bank, Washington, D.C.
* The views expressed herein are solely those of the authors and should not be attributed to
the International Finance Corporation or the World Bank.
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system as a whole to continue to operate throughout 1995, despite a
very sharp contraction in the real economy.
II. THE MExicAN BANKING SYSTEM BEFORE THE CRISIS
The rapid devaluation of the peso and its aftermath hit a rela-
tively new banking system. When the sudden fall in the value of the
peso occurred in late December 1994, the market for financial services
was still undergoing a process of maturation, with both the banks and
the supervisory authorities working to improve their institutional ca-
pacity in order to be effective in this new environment. In 1990, con-
stitutional amendments and new banking legislation1 set the stage for
the return of the commercial banking industry to private hands.
2
Mexican legislators opted for the conglomerate banking model, per-
mitting the establishment of holding companies with subsidiaries en-
gaged in banking, securities, insurance and other financial services.
Between June 1991 and July 1992, all of the commercial banks were
privatized, most of which became subsidiaries of newly-established fi-
nancial holding companies (grupos financieros).
A. Development of the Banking System
The international financial community was generally of the opin-
ion that Mexico was "underbanked" during the period of state owner-
ship of the commercial banks (1982-1991/2). For most of that period,
banks were principally invested in government securities rather than
loans to private sector entities. Not surprisingly, once privatized,
banks competed fiercely to gain market share in the provision of
loans, both by increasing the volume of their existing lines of business
and by entering the markets for relatively new financial services, such
as home mortgages and credit cards. As a consequence, between 1991
and 1994, aggregate assets of the commercial banks increased by
111.3% in nominal terms, or by 64.6% in real terms, equivalent to a
1 The Credit Institutions Law (Ley de Instituciones de Crddito) was introduced in July 1990
and has been amended on a number of occasions. It replaced an earlier law that was drafted to
govern the activities of the banks nationalized in 1982. Together with the Financial Groups Law
(Ley para Regular las Agrupaciones Financieras), it established the basis for the conglomerate
banking model in effect in Mexico today. The Credit Institutions Law was intended to provide
an appropriate legal framework for the capital structure, activities and supervison of the repriva-
tized banking system as well as the for the activities of the state-owned development banks.
2 Mexico's commercial banks (with the exception of Citibank and Banco Obrero) were na-
tionalized in 1982 in the wake of the debt crisis. Prior to the initiation of the privatization pro-
gram, the 58 nationalized banks were reduced to eighteen banks through a process of
liquidations and mergers.
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real annual growth rate of 18.1%. In 1994, assets of the commercial
banking system averaged N$735 billion, equivalent to 58.8% of GDP,
compared to 42.5% for 1991. The growth rate of the banks' loan port-
folios was even higher than that of assets. From year-end 1991
through year-end 1994, aggregate gross loans (excluding discounted
loans) increased by 142.9% in nominal terms, or by 89.2% in real
terms, equivalent to an annual real growth rate of 23.7% (more than
eight times the rate of GDP growth during the period).
Although deposit mobilization also improved significantly after
privatization, with the ratio of average deposits to GDP increasing
from 21.4% in 1991 to 31.3% in 1994, the rate of growth of loan port-
folios outstripped that of deposits. The ratio of loans to deposits in-
creased steadily from 94.1% at the end of 1991 to 113.8% by 1993, and
still further to 124.0% by 1994. Unable to attract conventional depos-
its fast enough to support new lending, many banks increased their
reliance on interbank funding, the bulk of which consisted of ines of
credit from foreign banks. Interbank lines increased from the
equivalent of N$34 billion at the end of 1991 (of which N$23 billion
were denominated in foreign currency) to N$124 billion at the end of
1994, of which the equivalent of N$92 billion (US$17.3 billion) were
denominated in foreign currency.
A rapid expansion of lending to private enterprises usually takes
place at the cost of a drop-off in portfolio quality, and Mexico appears
to have been no exception. Whereas aggregate past due loans (includ-
ing both principal and interest) of commercial banks (excluding Banco
Union and Banca Cremi)3 accounted for 4.09% of gross loans (includ-
ing discounted loans) at the end of 1991, by the end of 1993 the ratio
stood at 7.25 %.4 During the first half of 1994, the ratio increased fur-
ther to 8.30% before decreasing to 7.33% by year-end (see Table 1),
largely due to a 27% increase in gross loans during the second half of
the year. At the same time, the ratio of non-performing credits (de-
3 Banco Union and Banca Cremi were intervened by the authorities in September 1994 (see
"Regulation and Supervision," below).
4 In analyzing the data on Mexico's banking system, it is important to keep in mind that
Mexican banks prepare their financial statements under Mexican Generally Accepted Account-
ing Principles ("Mexican GAAP") and that these differ in a number of important respects from
U.S. GAAP, including the definition and treatment of non-performing loans, of provisions and
of the accrual of interest income on loans. In the wake of the peso crisis, the CNBV has an-
nounced that it will issue revised uniform accounting rules, similar to those of U.S. GAAP, for
financial statements and regulatory reports of Mexican banks beginning with their year-end 1996
accounts.
Mexico's Banks After the December 1994 Devaluation
16:24 (1995)
fined as the three lowest of the five credit categories)5 to gross credits
(which include loans plus off-balance sheet exposures) increased
steadily from 5.20% at the end of 1991, to 6.65% by 1992, to 8.15% by
1993, and finally to 8.80% by 1994.
Table 1: Loan Portfolio Quality and Loan Loss
Provisions of Mexican Commercial Banks', 1991-94
(in millions of N$ and percentages at year-end)
1991 1992 1993 1994
Gross loans2  240,153 336,907 421,126 594,205
Past due loans 9,828 18,757 30,527 43.544
Loan loss provisions 4,994 9,072 13,045 20,849
Equity 21,336 28,802 37,383 44,667
Ratios (%) Past due/Gross loans 4.09 5.57 7.25 7.33
Non-Performing credits/Gross 5.20 6.65 8.15 8.80
credit risks'
Provisions/Gross loans 2.08 2.69 3.10 3.51
Provisions/Past due 50.81 48.37 42.73 47.88
Open loan exposure4/Equity 22.66 33.62 46.77 50.81
Open loan exposure/Adjusted 40.86 53.97 71.47 73.91
stockholders' equity'
Net capital/Risk-weighted assets 7.73 9.01 9.94 9.60
Aggregates exclude Cremi and Union, which were intervened in September 1994.
2 Including discounted loans.
3 Gross credit risks include gross loans and off-balance sheet risks (i.e., discounted
loans, guarantees and irrevocable lines of credit). Non-performing credits comprise
loans classified in categories C, D and E. Figures for gross and non-performing
credit risks actually relate to the preceding quarter.
4 Open loan exposure is defined as the difference between past due loans and loan
loss provisions.
5 Defined as stockholders' equity less revaluation surplus.
Source: National Banking and Securities Commission
Recognizing the drop-off in asset quality accompanying the trans-
formation of the Mexican banking system, banks substantially in-
creased provisions to cover their actual and potential loan losses.
Aggregate loan loss provisions more than doubled from nearly N$5.0
billion at the end of 1991 to more than N$13.0 billion by year-end
1993. However, the ratio of provisions to past due loans actually de-
creased from 50.8% to 42.7% during the two-year interval, before re-
bounding somewhat to 47.9% by year-end 1994.
Notwithstanding the shortfall in the banks' provisions, the banks'
capital adequacy ratios improved during the period 1991-1994, as the
financial authorities instituted a phased increase of the minimum re-
5 The five categories are: minimal risk (A); low risk (B); moderate risk (C); high risk (D);
and loss (E), with the latter three categories considered as the non-performing component of the
portfolio.
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quired ratio of net capital to risk-weighted assets, from 6% at the end
of 1991 to 7% by the end of 1992, and then to 8% by the end of 1993.
As shown in Table 1 above, the average ratio increased from 7.73% at
the end of 1991 to 9.94% by 1993, and still further to 10.27% by the
end of September 1994, before decreasing to 9.60% by year-end, due
to the losses suffered during December in the wake of the peso
devaluation.
B. Regulation and Supervision
Authority for regulating the activities of banks in Mexico is
shared among the Banco de Mexico (Mexico's central bank),6 the
Ministry of Finance and Public Credit and the National Banking and
Securities Commission.7 After privatization, the authorities intro-
duced changes to the legislative and regulatory framework for bank-
ing to encourage competition, reduce intermediation costs, assure
adequate capitalization and discourage unsound practices. At the
same time as the new privatized banking regime was set in place, de-
posit lending rates, reserve requirements, requirements to lend to spe-
cific 'sectors and other limitations on bank lending activities were
significantly deregulated. In July 1993, amendments to the Credit In-
stitutions Law and Financial Groups Laws were approved which
weakened the restrictions on the types of services which could be pro-
vided by banks and other financial entities. New regulations were also
issued governing the treatment of newly-introduced financial instru-
ments (such as exchange coverage contracts), marketing of financial
products (including mutual funds), securities activities of banks and
the establishment of independent credit bureaus.
Although steps to improve banking supervision were taken at the
time of privatization of the commercial banks, efforts to fully equip
the National Banking and Securities Commission (Comisi6n Nacional
Bancaria y de Valores or CNBV) to supervise the new system began
only in 1994.8 An institutional development plan was initiated by the
6 In June 1993, the Mexican Constitution was amended and legislation went into effect
granting the Banco de Mexico greater autonomy and more clearly defining its functions as those
relating to conduct of monetary policy and supervision of the payments system and foreign ex-
change markets.
7 The Credit Institutions Law established the National Banking Commission (created under
earlier legislation) as the chief supervisory authority for both private commercial banks and
state-owned development banks.
8 The Banking and Securities Commission Law (Ley de la Comisidn Nacional Bancaria y de
Valores), which went into effect on May 1, 1995, provided for the merger of the National Bank-
ing Commission with the National Securities Commission, the principal regulator of the securi-
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CNBV in mid-1994 under the CNBV's new management team
(headed by CNBV President Eduardo Fernandez Garcia, a highly re-
garded former Banco de Mexico lawyer) and the government an-
nounced a plan to merge regulation of securities and banking in late
1994. One of the principal goals of the merger was to facilitate the
effective supervision of financial groups on a consolidated basis by
placing the supervisors of Mexico's brokerage houses under the same
roof as the supervisors of their bank affiliates.
The reorganized CNBV's first test came in June 1994 when, as a
result of the discovery of irregular transactions in the course of regular
bank inspections, the CNBV effected the administrative intervention
of Banca Cremi and Banco Union, both commercial bank subsidiaries
of the Grupo Financiero Cremi-Union. On September 6, 1994, after
discovering numerous additional irregularities and evidence of fraud
involving related party transactions affecting the soundness and sol-
vency of these banks, the CNBV removed the management of both
banks and appointed a management intervenor for the group and its
subsidiaries.' After the appointment of the intervenor, losses of
N$4,750 million from bad loans, fraud and the effects of the devalua-
tion were recognized and an additional N$2,350 million of capital was
injected by the Bank Fund for Savings Protection (described below).
After instituting the intervention of Cremi and Union, the board of
directors of the CNBV established an intervention committee to assist
in resolving the intervened subsidiaries of Grupo Financiero Cremi-
Union. The committee's goals included reassuring depositors and
creditors that the intervened banks, with the support of the Bank
Fund for Savings Protection, would continue to comply with their
obligations.
Although the CremilUnion intervention demonstrated the
CNBV's willingness and ability to uncover irregularities and take
drastic action when necessary, bank supervisory capacity nevertheless
remained limited at the onset of the crisis. A basic framework for
implementing new policies and procedures for bank inspections had
been put in place by the CNBV's management, but there had not been
ties industry. For simplicity, the term CNBV is used herein throughout to refer to the National
Banking Commission, both before and after its merger with the Securities Commission.
9 The CNBV take-over of Cremi-Union was the first such intervention since the privatiza-
tion of the banking system. Earlier in 1994, the CNBV and FOBAPROA negotiated an arrange-
ment with Banco Obrero (a bank owned by Mexican labor unions, which was never
nationalized) under which FOBAPROA made a capital infusion of N$300 million in exchange
for a majority interest. Inspections of Banco Obrero had exposed insufficient capitalization and
certain past management deficiencies.
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sufficient time to prepare an adequate number of trained and exper-
ienced inspectors to be fully effective.
C. Bank Fund for Savings Protection (FOBAPROA)
The Credit Institutions Law provided for the establishment of the
Bank Fund for Savings Support (Fondo Bancario para Protecci6n de
Ahorro, or FOBAPROA, successor to an earlier bank support fund)
and defined the legal basis for its provision of "preventive support" to
troubled banks. FOBAPROA's operations are funded through annual
and special contributions from commercial banks and from credit ex-
tended to FOBAPROA by the Banco de Mexico.1"
FOBAPROA's role goes beyond simple deposit insurance.
Under the Credit Institutions Law, the fund is required to give notice
each December of the types of bank assets it will cover the following
calendar year. Each year since its inception, FOBAPROA has stated
its intention to assure the payment of all liabilities of Mexican banks,
other than subordinated debt. The fund has broad powers to extend
preventive support to banks to permit them to meet such obligations.
Such support may be secured by a pledge of the shares of a commer-
cial bank recipient or, under amendments approved in February 1995
(described below), its financial holding company. Under the amend-
ments approved in February 1995 (and arguably before such amend-
ments), FOBAPROA is empowered to exercise the voting rights of
shares that have been pledged to it. If amounts extended as preven-
tive support are not repaid, or if serious undercapitalization or irregu-
larities are uncovered in a bank, FOBAPROA may vote the shares it
has received in pledge, take majority control of the bank or financial
group, replace management, write down the bank's capital in accord-
ance with the results of a full audit and sell the bank. As described
below, the flexibility accorded FOBAPROA under the Credit Institu-
tions Law has permitted it to function as the instrument for a number
of the Mexican government's responses to the effects of the peso crisis
on the banking sector.
10 FOBAPROA is organized as a trust administered by the central bank. However, Article
122 of the Credit Institutions Law establishes that FOBAPROA's policies will be set by a techni-
cal committee with members appointed by the Ministry of Finance and Public Credit, CNBV
and the Central Bank. A majority of the members of the technical committee are appointed by
the Ministry of Finance.
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III. IMPAcT OF THE DEVALUATION ON THE FINANCIAL SYSTEM
The banking system was severely shaken by the peso crisis. The
two immediate adverse effects were the foreign exchange losses in-
curred by the banks on account of their open short positions, and the
impairment in the value of the banks' investments (consisting mainly
of fixed-income securities) resulting from the sharp rise in interest
rates which followed the collapse of the peso. In addition to these
losses, banks were facing, on the one hand, significant liquidity pres-
sures which substantially increased their funding costs and, on the
other hand, an accelerated deterioration in the quality of their loan
portfolios because of the extremely high interest rates during the first
few months following the devaluation.'
A. Exchange Losses
Mexican banks are subject to two fairly restrictive limits on the
relative size of their foreign currency-denominated liabilities and their
net open foreign currency exposure. Under prevailing regulatory
guidelines, banks are required to limit their foreign currency liabilities
to no more than 20% of total liabilities, and their net open short or
long foreign currency positions to no more than 15% of net capital.
Although some banks appear to have recouped part of their losses by
converting their net short positions into net long positions shortly af-
ter the December 20 devaluation, but before the further decline of the
peso, the net foreign currency losses incurred by the banking system
were not negligible. Published financial statements indicated that at
least eight banks (including the three largest) recorded significant
fourth quarter losses. For the system as a whole, fourth quarter for-
eign exchange losses totaled about N$4.6 billion, equivalent to more
than 10% of equity.
B. Interest Rate Exposure
The banks' aggregate investment portfolio increased by about
84% in 1994 to reach a level of N$85.9 billion at year-end. The bulk
of these investments consisted of fixed-income securities (N$55.8 bil-
lion), whose value was impaired by the sharp hike in interest rates. In
the aftermath of the peso devaluation, the CNBV issued in January
1995 a new regulation requiring banks to value their securities at mar-
11 Mexico's then newly-appointed Secretary of Finance and Public Credit Guillermo Ortiz
described the immediate and medium-term effects of the peso crisis on the banking system in the
immedate aftermath of the devaluation in a presentation to the investor community in New York
on January 5, 1995.
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ket prices and to disclose their unrealized gains or losses on their fi-
nancial assets and liabilities in their off-balance sheet accounts as of
end-1994. Published financial statements indicate that only Mexico's
largest bank, Banamex, realized losses on its securities portfolio, total-
ing N$869 million, equivalent to 7.9% of its equity at year-end. Most
of the other banks showed unrealized gains, since the valuation
method adopted by CNBV (which differs from U.S. GAAP) takes
into account both financial assets and financial liabilities. Thus, the
banking system, excluding Banamex, showed an aggregate unrealized
gain of N$209 million, equivalent to 0.6% of equity. Including
Banamex, the losses (both realized and unrealized) amounted to
N$660 million, equivalent to 1.5% of the system's equity at year-end.
C. Liquidity Problems
At the end of 1994, aggregate deposits with the commercial banks
(excluding Union and Cremi) totaled N$413.9 billion, of which 18.3%
was denominated in foreign currency and 73.6% consisted of time de-
posits. The latter comprised promissory notes (N$164.6 billion), fixed
deposits (N$89.2 billion), bank bonds (N$38.0 billion), and
subordinated obligations (N$13.0 billion). About 15.6% of the time
deposits, or the equivalent of N$65.4 billion, were raised by the 13
banks that operated branches (28 in total) outside Mexico. The bulk
of these time deposits consisted of U.S. dollar-denominated CDs,
which reportedly amounted to about US$8 billion.
As a result of the peso crisis, the banks came under significant
liquidity pressure, as they found it extremely difficult to roll-over ma-
turing CDs. In fact, during the first three months of 1995, aggregate
foreign currency-denominated deposits with the commercial banks
(including Union and Cremi), decreased by 23% or by more than
US$3.5 billion, to stand at end-March 1995 at US$11.8 billion,
equivalent to 15.8% of total deposits.
The pressure on the banks was initially compounded by the Gov-
ernment's difficulty in dealing with the problem of its maturing dollar-
denominated short-term instruments (Tesobonos). The liquidity
assistance provided by FOBAPROA to the commercial banks (de-
scribed below), which amounted to US$3.3 billion during the first
quarter of 1995, significantly improved the banks' liquidity position.
However, the liquidity crunch had significant adverse effects on the
banks' average cost of funds and, hence, on their profitability during
the first half of 1995.
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D. Loan Portfolio Quality
As described above, the high rate of growth of banks' loan port-
folios in the period after privatization was accompanied by an increase
in the levels of non-performing loans when the peso crisis ensued.
The banks' recognition of the deterioration of their loan portfolios
was reflected by the additional loan loss provisions taken. Aggregate
new loan loss provisions taken during the fourth quarter of 1994
amounted to more than N$5.3 billion, compared to N$5.5 billion for
the first three quarters combined. As a result of these heavy charges,
coming on top of the foreign exchange losses, the impairment in the
value of the securities portfolio, and the unrealized losses from the
banks' subsidiaries, the banking system (excluding Cremi and Union)
recorded an aggregate loss before tax of N$3.5 billion during the
fourth quarter of 1994, equivalent to 43% of profits (before tax) dur-
ing the first three quarters of the year, and to 7.9% of the equity at
year-end.
Since a large share of lending in Mexico is at floating rates ad-
justed monthly, the prevailing high interest rates quickly diminished
borrowers' ability to service their debts. As part of the Government's
revised economic program, monetary policy was tightened substan-
tially, causing nominal interest rates on peso-denominated Treasury
bills to rise to approximately 75% by March 1995. Interest rates on
consumer debt, mortgages and commercial credit rose above 80%
during the months immediately following devaluation, before falling
back into the 30-40% range by late spring. In addition to falling be-
hind in their debt service payments, debtors in increasing numbers
joined a chorus of associations calling for the Government to relieve
some of their plight. Partially in response to debtor sentiment that the
interest rate "bubble" of the early part of the year endangered the
survival of otherwise viable businesses, the Government introduce the
ADE program in September 1995 (see below).
The drop-off in the quality of the loan portfolios of the major
commercial banks is illustrated in Table 2 below. The ratio of past due
loans to gross loans of the group, increased from 7.29% at end-1994 to
9.64% by the end of March 1995, and further to 12.21% by the end of
July 1995. Although banks substantially increased their loan loss pro-
visions during the first three months of 1995 by an aggregate amount
of N$8.63 billion and by another N$7.65 billion by July 1995, the ratio
of provisions to past due loans stood at 55.34% by March 1995 and
55.23% by July 1995.
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Table 2: Loan Portfolio Quality
of Major Mexican Commercial Banks'




Gross loans 561,383 617,268 602,085
Past due loans 40,931 59,507 73,488
Loan loss provisions 19,724 32,932 40,584
Equity 42,856 51,487 55,480
Ratios (%)
Past due/Gross loans 7.29 9.64 12.21
Provisions/Gross loans 3.51 5.34 6.74
Provisions/Past due 48.19 55.34 55.23
Open loan exposure'/Equity 49.48 51.62 59.31
Net capital/Risk-weighted assets 9.64 10.18 10.76
Includes all privatized banks except those intervened or controlled by FOBAPROA
(Cremi, Union, Banpais, and Oriente).
2 Open loan exposure is defined as the difference between past due loans and loan
loss provisions.
Source: National Banking and Securities Commission
E. Capitalization
The significant new loan provisions noted above and the banks'
increased funding costs impacted negatively on the banks' capital po-
sition. During the first two months of 1995, the aggregate equity of
the group of nineteen banks decreased by N$4.5 billion or by 10.6%.
Consequently, the group's average ratio of net capital to risk-weighted
assets decreased during the interval from 9.40% to 7.75%. In fact, at
the end of February 1995, nine out of the nineteen banks had ratios
below 8%, as compared to only three at the end of 1994.
IV. TiE GOVERNMENT'S RESPONSE TO T=E BANKING CRISIS
A. Crisis Management Measures (January - February 1995)
1. Provision of Liquidity to Banks
As noted above, Mexican banks faced an immediate liquidity cri-
sis in both dollars and pesos in the immediate aftermath of the devalu-
ation. The Government's response was to establish a special
FOBAPROA window to provide dollar liquidity while the Banco de
Mexico provided short-term peso credit as lender of last resort. Use
of these facilities was extensive in the early months of the crisis, but
soon began to gradually decrease as banks reduced lending and other
sources of funding again became available.
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In the immediate aftermath of the peso devaluation, most of
Mexico's commercial banks encountered extreme difficulty in re-
newing their maturing dollar obligations. Mirroring the Govern-
ment's Tesobono difficulties, commercial banks found their CD
depositors and other lenders reluctant to roll over their investments.
The Government responded by establishing in early January a special
window (provided by FOBAPROA) for short-term dollar lending (ini-
tially on 28 day terms, later shortened). In order to provide strong
incentives for commercial banks to substitute private sector funding at
the earliest possible time, FOBAPROA charged interest on such cred-
its of up to 25% and required the loans to be secured by government
securities, debt securities of Nacional Financiera, S.N. C. (the state de-
velopment bank) or equity securities of the recipient bank. On March
31, 1995, the total outstanding balances drawn by ten of the commer-
cial banks were about US$3.3 billion. However, as the immediate cri-
sis passed, banks were successful in finding cheaper sources of funding
and by August 1995, balances owed to FOBAPROA had been repaid.
Most Mexican banks also generally experienced significant diffi-
culty in maintaining their peso funding. Interbank peso lending rates
rose substantially as banks used pesos to buy dollars to retire maturing
dollar-denominated CDs. There also appears to have been significant
"flight to quality" with depositors withdrawing from smaller banks
and redepositing pesos in larger and presumably sounder institutions.
As part of its lender of last resort function, immediately following the
devaluation the Banco de Mexico began providing peso liquidity to
certain Mexican banks through special credit auctions. Such credit
was initially provided on an unsecured basis as some banks were ex-
periencing a shortage of eligible collateral. In order to ensure that li-
quidity provision did not become a means to delay recognition of
insolvency, after March 20,1995 the Banco de Mexico began requiring
banks to post government securities, securities of Nacional Financiera
and loans provided to prime borrowers as collateral in such peso
credit auctions. Outstanding balances stood at the equivalent of
US$3.0 billion by March 31, 1995 with most established banks partici-
pating in the auctions at some point. As the immediate crisis passed,
however, banks were able to return to the private money markets and
ceased to rely on FOBAPROA for peso liquidity.
B. Relaxation of Foreign Investment Restrictions
Historically, Mexican financial sector legislation has included
sharp limits on foreign participation in financial institutions operating
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in Mexico. In anticipation of the entry into force of the North Ameri-
can Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA), in December 1993 the Credit
Institutions Law, Financial Groups Law, Capital Markets Law (Ley
del Mercado de Valores) and other financial sector legislation was
amended to provide for a special category of wholly-owned foreign-
controlled financial holding companies, commercial banks, brokerage
houses and other types of financial institutions, where authorized by
treaty. However, under the 1993 amendments to the Credit Institu-
tions Law, foreign-controlled commercial banks were subjected to in-
dividual and aggregate market-share limitations. No single foreign-
controlled bank could represent more than 1.5% of the capital of the
Mexican banking system and all foreign banks taken together were
limited to no more than eight percent of the market. 12 NAFTA pro-
vided for a gradual increase in the aggregate market share limitation
and its elimination by the year 2000.
In an effort to attract additional capital to the financial system,
Mexico's financial sector legislation was further amended in February
1995 to permit foreign individuals and foreign companies as a group to
hold up to 49% of the voting shares of a Mexican-controlled financial
holding company, commercial bank or brokerage house, entities not
subject to market share limitations. The previous ceiling for Mexican-
controlled commercial banks had been 30%. Just as importantly, in
order to encourage take-overs or mergers between better capitalized
foreign financial institutions and existing Mexican banks, the amend-
ments permitted foreign financial institutions to purchase a control-
ling interest in any Mexican commercial bank with a market share of
less than 6%. As originally submitted to the Mexican Congress, the
amendments provided for no individual or aggregate market-share
limitations. The 6% limit and an aggregate 25% cap on foreign-con-
trolled banks were added to the legislation during Congressional con-
sideration on the grounds that permitting foreign control of any of
Mexico's three largest banks might compromise the domestic pay-
ments system.13 The market share limitations effectively placed
Banamex, Bancomer and Serfin off limits for a possible merger with a
foreign-owned institution, but relaxation of the earlier 1.5% individ-
12 The first bank charters under this legislation were approved by the Ministry of Finance
and Public Credit only in August 1994. None of these new foreign-controlled banks had estab-
lished substantial operations by the time of the devaluation.
13 For a detailed description of the February 1995 amendments, see Lubrano, Mexico
Amends Financial Sector Legislation to Attract Greater Investment and Reinforce Supervision,
North American Corporate Lawyer, Vol. II, No. 4 (1995), at 90-93.
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ual market share limitation was crucial to permitting the recapitaliza-
tion of Probursa by Spain's Banco Bilbao Vizcaya (described below).
C. Interventions
At the same time as Mexico's financial sector legislation was
amended to permit greater foreign participation, changes were made
to the Credit Institutions Law and the Financial Groups Law which
were intended to facilitate the expeditious intervention and disposi-
tion of decapitalized banks. Amendments to the Financial Groups
Law provided that "preventive support" could be provided by
FOBAPROA to the financial holding company to be channeled to its
bank subsidiary. In such cases, support can be collateralized by a
pledge of capital stock of the financial holding company, potentially
giving FOBAPROA control over all affiliates of a bank in the event of
its insolvency. In addition, the rules governing the pledge of shares of
an institution (financial holding company or commercial bank) receiv-
ing support from FOBAPROA were toughened in two important
ways: (i) such pledges were accorded the status of preferential liens
(and in the case of commercial banks, preferential liens of public in-
terest); and (ii) the amendments included explicit language to the ef-
fect that the granting of such pledges conveys to FOBAPROA the
right to exercise (without the need for execution of the pledge) all
corporate and ownership rights over such pledged share (including
voting rights). The law continues to require that a share be valued at
75% of book value for purposes of calculating the number of shares
that must be pledged as collateral for preventive support provided by
FOBAPROA.
On February 16, 1995, immediately upon the entry into force of
the amendments to the Credit Institutions Law and Financial Groups
Law clarifying FOBAPROA's power to vote the shares of financial
institutions pledged as collateral for preventive support, FOBAPROA
acted under the new legislation to restructure the capital of Banca
Cremi and Banco Union to eliminate the interest of its existing share-
holders. The share capital of these two banks is now wholly-owned by
FOBAPROA as the financial authorities consider plans for final dis-
position of the institutions and/or their assets. Also in February 1995,
the CNBV ordered an immediate management intervention of Grupo
Financiero Banpais - Asemex after inspections turned up sharply in-
creased past due loans, a shortage of capital and irregular related
party transactions. An intervenor and an intervention committee
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were appointed and the management, although not the ownership, is
now under the control of the authorities.
D. Increased Provisions
On February 22, 1995, the CNBV required all banks to increase
the level of provisions to the higher of: (a) 4% of the loan portfolio; or
(b) 60% of past due loans; or (c) provisions required from quarterly
loan classifications under earlier rules. The new requirement reflected
a concern that careful loan classification and provisioning had become
difficult for banks to manage in the context of an economic crisis af-
fecting a majority of borrowers. All banks found themselves required
to raise provisions under the new formula, but in doing so, several fell
short of the requirement for 8% capitalization. Aggregate loan loss
provisions increased substantially from N$24.5 billion at the end of
1994 to N$54.1 billion by the end of July 1995.
E. Temporary Recapitalization Program (PROCAPTE)
In February 1995, the Government introduced the Temporary
Capitalization Program (Programa de Capitalizacion Temporal or
PROCAPTE) to assist those banks that, due to the effects of the crisis
and the requirement of increasing provisions, were unable to comply
with the minimum 8% capitalization rule.14 Under the program,
FOBAPROA purchased subordinated convertible debentures from
participating banks in amounts sufficient to raise their ratio of net cap-
ital to risk-weighted assets to 9% and the banks deposited the pro-
ceeds in an account at the Banco de Mexico which paid interest at the
same rate as the rate on the debentures. Under PROCAPTE, when-
ever a participating bank's capitalization ratio falls below 8.5%,
FOBAPROA may subscribe additional subordinated convertible de-
bentures sufficient to restore the bank's 9% capitalization ratio.
FOBAPROA is required to convert the subordinated debentures out-
standing at the end of five years into equity shares of the bank. How-
ever, the convertibility feature may be invoked earlier if a
participating bank's capital falls below 2% of its risk-weighted assets,
or if the bank's capitalization, excluding the PROCAPTE obligations,
varies more than 25% from the trend of average capitalization of all
the banks participating in the program. If, on the other hand, a bank's
capitalization ratio improves to exceed 9%, the bank may redeem
14 The program details were published in a circular dated February 24, 1995 of the Banco de
Mexico address to commercial banks.
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(partially or in full) the subordinated debentures held by
FOBAPROA prior to their conversion.
The objective of the PROCAPTE program was to permit under-
capitalized (but solvent) banks to continue to operate, while encour-
aging their prompt recapitalization through the threat of dilution
presented by the mandatory convertible subordinated debentures. By
March 31, six banks had entered the scheme (including Mexico's
third-largest bank, Serfin). The combined equity of these six banks,
which amounted to N$10.2 billion at the end of 1994 (equivalent to
22.8% of the system's total equity), had decreased by almost N$3.0
billion during the first two months of 1995. Their average capitaliza-
tion ratio had declined from 8.13% at the end of 1994 to 5.82% by the
end of February 1995. The PROCAPTE obligations issued totaled
N$6.5 billion, thereby enabling the banks to raise their average capi-
talization ratios to 9.60%. A seventh capital-deficient bank, Probursa,
was given additional time to meet the minimum capital requirements
in anticipation of an agreement by Banco Bilbao Vizcaya (BBV), a
Spanish bank and already an important shareholder, to make a sub-
stantial capital infusion and convert Probursa into an affiliate. As of
this writing, only three commercial banks remain in PROCAPTE, two
having recapitalized in return for FOBAPROA's purchase of a sub-
stantial part of their portfolio (described below) and one having been
intervened.
F. Medium-term Management of the Banking Crisis
1. Bank Recapitalizations
Due at least in part to the actions described in the previous sec-
tion, the peso devaluation and the subsequent economic recession
were not accompanied by a collapse of the banking system in the
months immediately following the devaluation. However, even after
such steps, it was evident that Mexico's banks needed to increase their
capital substantially in order to assure that a slow recovery would not
again place the soundness of the banking system at risk. Attracting
new capital to the banking system was clearly a priority of the authori-
ties once the immediate crisis had passed. The final agreement be-
tween the Mexican authorities and BBV for the recapitalization of
Probursa proved to be a model for the recapitalizations of other Mexi-
can banks which have followed.
In the Probursa transaction, FOBAPROA agreed to partially
clean-up Probursa's balance sheet by purchasing loans from its portfo-
lio at book value less proper provisions, as determined by external
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auditors. In return, BBV agreed to make a capital infusion into the
bank equal to one-half the value of the portfolio purchased by
FOBAPROA. FOBAPROA paid for the Probursa portfolio with ten-
year bonds bearing interest at a rate equal to that on 28-day Mexican
treasury bills. According to the agreement, the purchased portfolio
would continue to be managed by Probursa, but for the account of
FOBAPROA. As a result of this operation, Probursa's ratio of net
capital to risk-weighted assets increased to 10.1% by the end of July
1995.
A variation on the Probursa recapitalization model was subse-
quently applied in the case of Mexico's third-largest bank, Banca
Serfin, with the controlling Mexican shareholder group agreeing to in-
ject additional capital raised from their own and outside resources. In
July 1995, FOBAPROA purchased loans from Serfin totaling N$4,940
million, on the condition that Serfin's shareholders purchase N$1,240
million in shares, N$930 million in convertible subordinated bonds
and N$600 million in non-convertible subordinated bonds. As in the
Probursa example, Serfin continued to manage the loans purchased by
FOBAPROA. Serfin, however, agreed to share 20% of the losses the
portfolio might ultimately generate, thereby preserving its incentive to
effectively manage the portfolio. The operation permitted Serfin to
exit the PROCAPTE program by retiring the mandatory convertible
subordinated debentures issued under that program and also to in-
crease its ratio of net capital to risk-weighted assets from 10.0% at the
end of March to 11.0% at the end of July.
The authorities have since reached agreements for the recapitali-
zation of Banco Atlantico, Banco Promex and Banco Internacional
and their exit from PROCAPTE. The percentages of capital injected
in the form of shares, convertible subordinated debt and non-converti-
ble subordinated debt, and the timing of the injections of new capital,
have varied among agreements. As of this writing, although agree-
ments with these three banks have been publicized, the purchase of
portfolio by FOBAPROA and the injections of additional capital are
still awaiting consummation. It is expected that some or all of the
remaining banks in the PROCAPTE program will ultimately reach
similar agreements permitting them to exit that program.
G. Debt Restructuring - UDI Scheme
On April 1, 1995, the Mexican Congress approved legislation per-
mitting the use of an inflation-indexed unit of account for financial
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transactions (Unidad de Inversi6n or UDI).15 Both new transactions
and restructurings of pre-existing loans could be denominated in
UDIs. The value of the UDI in pesos is updated daily by the Banco de
Mexico based on its estimate of the consumer price index. Unlike cer-
tain other experiments with indexation (such as Unidades de Fomento
in Chile), UDI indexing of non-financial contracts, such as wage
agreements and commercial contracts, was not authorized. The UDI
was introduced solely to permit financial contracts to be dominated or
restructured in a real unit of account, insuring borrowers against rapid
increases in real interest rates while assuring lenders a rate of return
in excess of inflation. Denominating the principal amount of a new or
restructured loan in UDIs also has the effect of reducing or eliminat-
ing the accelerated real amortization of loans that results when high
inflation eats away at the principal. Accelerated real amortization is
undesirable from the borrower's prospective, since it concentrates re-
payment (in real terms) in the earliest payments and causes lenders to
charge higher interest rates to compensate for the erosion of the prin-
cipal by inflation.
Of course, banks could not provide much in the way of UDI-de-
nominated credits without a source of UDI-denominated funding
from the public or the capital markets. In order to accelerate the ap-
plication of UDI-denominated restructurings, especially for viable
borrowers encountering difficulty in servicing their earlier non-in-
dexed debts, the government introduced a series of support programs
(programas de apoyo), granting banks UDI-denominated funding for
limited amounts of qualifying loans to industry, housing, states and
municipalities and certain development banks' loans. Under these
programs, the government lends the banks funds to finance the re-
structured loans at a real rate of interest (by denominating such loans
in UDIs). The government in turn finances this extension of credit by
borrowing from the banks at market determined nominal interest
rates based on the 28 day Mexican treasury bill rate. Restructured
loans financed by banks through these programs are segregated into
trusts, with the proceeds of such loans applied, in part, to the amorti-
zation of the government-provided funding.
16
Apparently, due in some part to their complexity and to the diffi-
culty of explaining UDIs to certain types of borrowers, commercial
15 The law governing the calculation and permitted application of UDIs was published in the
Diario Oficial, April 1, 1995, at 2.
16 The complex details of the UDI support programs are set forth in a series of circulars,
beginning with Circular number 1234 of the CNBV, dated April 24, 1995.
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banks have been slow to make full use of the UDI support programs.
Only in the area of mortgage lending, where Mexican borrowers' ex-
perience with indexed instruments made the UDI program perhaps
more understandable, has the response been dramatic.
H. Debt Restructuring - ADE Scheme
Once the interest rate "bubble" of the early months of the crisis
was over, the government and the banks were anxious to encourage
enterprises to reach agreement with lenders and return to servicing
non-performing loans. On August 23, 1995, an additional program
was instituted by the government to provide direct interest subsidies
to certain borrowers from commercial banks. The Agreement of Im-
mediate Support of Bank Debtors (Acuerdo de Apoyo Inmediato a
Deudores de la Banca or ADE)1 7 negotiated between the government
and the Mexican Bankers Association was intended to preempt more
extreme measures being promoted by certain borrower pressure
groups and bring loans to viable borrowers back into performing sta-
tus. The ADE program accelerates the restructuring of non-perform-
ing as well as performing loans to viable borrowers by bridging, for a
one-year period, the gap between what borrowers were willing to pay
and what lenders were willing to accept. There is a cap on the maxi-
mum amount of a restructured loan that can benefit from the program
as well as a limit on the interest subsidy provided, both of which vary
depending on the class of debtor. The program also expanded the
original UDI program to include credit card and consumer loans.
The ADE program is available for credit card balances, personal
consumer debt, mortgage loans and commercial debt of enterprises.
Loans of borrowers signing a letter of intent to renegotiate their debts
with creditors by October 31 were eligible for the program.'8 The
signing of a letter of intent obligates the lending bank not to institute
enforcement actions against the debtor until January 31, 1996 and ob-
ligates both parties to undertake best efforts to reach an agreement on
restructuring in the meantime. Under the program, interest payable
by the borrower is capped during the year of the program's duration
at 38.5% for credit card balances, 34% for consumer loans and 25%
for commercial loans. Mortgage loans restructured into UDIs are
capped for a year at UDI + 6.5%. The government is financing the
17 The ADE program was heavily publicized and banks instituted training programs for
branch employees to educate them about the details of the program. Most or all branches of
Mexican banks made available to the public brochures clearly explaining the program.
18 Credit card loans are eligible for the program even without a letter of intent.
Mexico's Banks After the December 1994 Devaluation
16:24 (1995)
subsidy provided by the ADE program through the issuance of bonds
to the commercial banks. According to newspaper reports of CNBV
figures, as of October 27, 1995, 71.9% of eligible credit card loans,
60.0% of mortgages, 23.5% of business loans, and 24.6% of consumer
loans had been restructured.
